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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
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AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 2646

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS --QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY: SEVERAL DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN FEBRUARY HIGH-
LIGHTED PAK FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE QUARTER. THESE
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INCLUDED THE ASSASSINATION OF A KEY FRONTIER PROVINCE

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MINISTER AND THE GOP COUNTERMEASURES WHICH FOLLOWED;
THE LIFTING OF THE US ARMS EMBARGO FOLLOWING PM BHUTTO'S
WARM RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON; AND THE RETURN OF SHEIKH
ABDULLAH TO POWER IN KASHMIR. THEIR TIMING, THOUGH
COINCIDENTAL, INFLUENCED THE IMPACT THEY HAD.

ABDULLAH'S ACCESSION CONTRIBUTED TO THE INTERRUPTION--
HOPEFULLY ONLY A BRIEF ONE--IN THE NORMALIZATION OF INDO-
PAK RELATIONS. THE PAKS PROTESTED HIS RETURN BY A GENERAL
STRIKE DESIGNED TO PERSUADE INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND
REASSURE THE PAK AND KASHMIR PUBLIC THAT THE KASHMIR ISSUE
REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND CAN ONLY BE SETTLED ON THE BASIS
OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE STRIKE SO HEIGHTENED EMOTIONAL
PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE LARGELY DORMANT ISSUE AS TO MAKE
FORMAL GOP ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO IN THE
STATE EVEN MORE POLITICALLY HAZARDOUS AND UNLIKELY THAN
BEFORE. THE GOP REALIZES THE FOLLY INVOLVED IN ANOTHER
KASHMIR ADVENTURE, HOWEVER, AND WILL GO ON LIVING WITH THE
DE FACTO SITUATION. A SETTLEMENT IS AS DISTANT AS EVER.

THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CIVIL AIR NEGOTIATIONS, A
DEADLOCKED SIMLA AGENDA ITEM, WILL BE WIDELY REGARDED AS
THE CLEAREST INDICATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES
TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THE PAKS SEEM FLEXIBLE AND
HOPEFUL, THE INDIANS LESS SANGUINE. THE GOI SAYS
THAT DESPITE GOP ASSURANCES IT IS CONCERNED ABOUT PAK
ATTITUDES IN LIGHT OF ALLEGEDLY STEPPED UP GOP
PROPAGANDA. ITS PERCEPTION MAY BE INFLUENCED BY ITS LONG
PROFESSED FEAR THAT THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO WOULD
PROMPT A MORE BELLICOSE PAK STANCE.

PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS DETERIORATED BADLY FOLLOWING THE
NWFP ASSASSINATION. THE SLAYING AND THE GOP'S REACTION TO
IT CAUSED THE CANCELLATION OF HIGH LEVEL PAK-AFGHAN DISCUSSIONS;
THESE HAD SEEMED THE MOST PROMISING DEVELOPMENT IN 18 MONTHS.
PROSPECTS FOR THEIR RESCHEDULING SEEM BLEAK. THE OUTLOOK
FOR IMPROVED TIES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED NOT ONLY
BY A HEIGHTENING OF BITTERNESS BUT ALSO BY A TIGHTENING
OF THE LINKS BETWEEN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND PAK DOMESTIC
POLITICS. RELATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY
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THE GOA'S REACTION TO THE US MILITARY SUPPLY DECISION AND
BY PRESIDENT DAOUD'S RECENT SUBCONTINENTAL TRAVEL. LITTLE
PROGRESS TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS SEEMS LIKELY FOR THE NEXT
COUPLE OF MONTHS, BUT NO FURTHER SERIOUS DETERIORATION
SEEMS IN PROSPECT EITHER.

PAK-BANGLADESH RELATIONS SHOW SOME SIGNS OF MOVING OFF DEAD
CENTER BUT PROGRESS SEEMS LARGELY UP TO DACCA WHICH SEES

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MORE AT STAKE. THE SHAH'S PRIVATE VISIT TO PAKISTAN HAD PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IN HIGHLIGHTING THE IMPORTANCE TO THE GOP OF IRANIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THE VISIT AND THE REINVIGORATION OF CENTO (AND OF PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN IT) HAVE STRENGTHENED PAK-IRANIAN TIES. SHOULD US-CONTROLLED WEAPONS BE TRANSFERRED FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN UNDER THE NEW SUPPLY POLICY, THIS WILL DO SO FURTHER.

THE GREAT WARMTH WHICH CHARACTERIZED BHUTTO'S US TRIP AND THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WHICH FOLLOWED BROUGHT BILATERAL US-PAK RELATIONS CLOSER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN FOR MANY YEARS. BUT THE GOP UNDERSTANDS THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE CHANGE AND THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL GOVERN US SCRUTINY OF PAK REQUESTS FOR ARMS PURCHASES. ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY THE GOP'S REALISTIC AND REASONABLE ATTITUDE COULD EVENTUALLY GIVE WAY TO WRANGLING OVER CONTROVERSIAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND TERMS OF PURCHASE, PROSPECTS FOR A FAIRLY LENGTHY PERIOD OF US-PAK GOODWILL ON BILATERAL MATTERS SEEM EXCELLENT.

GOP RELATIONS WITH THE PRC REMAIN VERY CLOSE, BUT CERTAIN STRAINS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED INTO PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS. PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO DERIVE HIGHLY TANGIBLE ECONOMIC AND LESS TANGIBLE POLITICAL BENEFITS FROM ITS ISLAMIC CONNECTIONS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK THE STRENGTHENING OF ITS MUSLIM AS WELL AS ITS THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS. END SUMMARY.

1. INTRODUCTION. SEVERAL DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS HIGHLIGHTED PAKISTAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE QUARTER YEAR NOW ENDING. THE TIMING OF THESE EVENTS--THE ASSASSINATION OF A KEY
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MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE AND THE COUNTERMEASURES TAKEN IN ITS WAKE BY THE GOP; THE LIFTING OF THE US EMBARGO ON THE SUPPLY OF LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S WARM RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON; AND THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN INDIA UNDER WHICH SHEIKH ABDULLAH RETURNED TO POWER IN WHAT THE PAKISTANIS CALL "OCCUPLIED" KASHMIR--WAS COINCIDENTAL. BUT THE FACT THAT THEY ALL OCCURRED WITHIN A THREE WEEK SPAN IN FEBRUARY INFLUENCED THE IMPACT THEY HAD IN PAKISTAN AND APPARENTLY IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA AS WELL.

2. INDIA. THE SLOW, OFTEN ERRATIC PROGRESS WHICH PAKISTAN AND INDIA HAVE MADE TOWARD NORMALIZING THEIR RELATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIMLA AGREEMENT WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PRIME

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MINISTER GANDHI AND PLEBISCITE FRONT LEADER SHEIKH ABDULLAH
WHICH LED TO ABDULLAH'S BECOMING INDIAN KASHMIR CHIEF
MINISTER. AWARENESS OF THE IMMINENCE OF THE AGREEMENT,
WHICH THE GOP HAD ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE WOULD BE FOLLOWED
BY A GENERAL STRIKE CALL IN INDIAN KASHMIR, AZAD KASHMIR,

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AND PAKISTAN ITSELF (AS WELL AS BY OVERSEAS KASHMIRIS),
CONTRIBUTED TO THE PAK DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT A GOI

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INVITATION TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS ON THE DEADLOCKED CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEM IN MID-FEBRUARY.

3. THE STRIKE CALL ITSELF, IMPLEMENTED WITH CONSIDERABLE FANFARE, WAS A DRAMATIC GESTURE DESIGNED TO PERSUADE CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND REASSURE THE PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR PUBLIC THAT DESPITE THE INDIRA-ABDULLAH AGREEMENT THE KASHMIR ISSUE REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND CAN ONLY BE SETTLED ON THE BASIS OF A PLEBISCITE AS PROVIDED FOR IN LONG-STANDING UN RESOLUTIONS. THE PAKS INSISTED THAT IT WAS THE LEAST THEY COULD DO TO COUNTER THE UNDOUBTED IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT AND SAID THAT IT SOULD NOT SIGNIFY ANY LESSENING OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO NORMALIZATION. TO UNDERSCORE THIS THEY TOLD THE INDIANS THEY WERE PREPARED TO BEGIN THE POSTPONED CIVIL AIR TALKS THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH. HOWEVER, RECENT WORD FROM DELHI IS THAT THE INDIANS PROFESS TO BE CONCERNED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDER AN UPSURGE IN ANTI-INDIAN PROPAGANDA OVER THE KASHMIR ISSUE AND ARE LESS SANGUINE THAN ARE THE PAKS ABOUT CHANCES FOR PROGRESS IN THE ATMOSPHERE THEY SAY THIS PROPAGANDA HAS CREATED.

4. WHATEVER ITS IMPACT ON IMMEDIATE ISSUES IN THE NORMAL-IZATION PROCESSN THE STRIKE WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE GOP REMAINS UNREADY TO MAKE ANY EFFORTS TO PREPARE THE PAK PUBLIC FOR A FORMAL KASHMIR SETTLEMENT WITH INDIA WHICH WOULD REFLECT OBJECTIVE REALITY, I.E., ACCEPTANCE OF THE LINE OF CONTROL AS THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. INDEED, THE AGREEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT STRIKE, WHICH BROUGHT PAKISTANAND AZAD KASHMIR TO A STANDSTILL AND WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE VALLEY, SO HEIGHTENED EMOTIONAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE LARGELY DORMANT KASHMIR ISSUE AS TO MAKE A GOP MOVE TOWARD A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF ANYTHING LESS THAN SELF-DETERMINATION EVEN MORE POLITICALLY HAZARDOUS AND UNLIKELY THAN BEFORE.

5. THE KASHMIR DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF A WEEK WHICH HAD BEGUN WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LIFTING OF THE US ARMS EMBARGO. THE USG HAD EARLIER BEEN REPEATEDLY WARNED BY THE INDIANS THAT A CHANGE IN ITS POLICY WOULD STRENGTHEN THOSE PAK ELEMENTS WHICH OPPOSE THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION CHARTED IN THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. (THE WARNINGS WERE PART OF A WELL-PUBLICIZED INDIAN EFFORT TO DISSUADE THE USG FROM SELLING LETHAL WEAPONS TO SOUTH ASIA; THIS EFFORT WAS VIEWED BY THE PAKS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A GOI DESIGN TO KEEP PAKISTAN WEAK SO AS TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN HEGEMONY IN THE SUBCONTINENT.) ALTHOUGH CONFIDENTIAL

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THESE INDIAN CONCERNS ABOUT A POTENTIAL HARDENING OF PAK ATTITUDES WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY OVERSTATED IN THE TELLING, THEY MAY INFLUENCE GOI PERCEPTION OF PAK MOVES AND STATEMENTS OVER THE NEXT MONTHS. INDIAN DISTRESS OVER PAK KASHMIR PROPAGANDA MAY WELL BE A CASE IN POINT. THE PAKS HAVE SOUGHT TO ALLAY INDIAN APPREHENSIONS IN A BHUTTO/GANDHI MESSAGE AND BY WORD PASSED THROUGH THE USG.

6. AFGHANISTAN. PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS DETERIORATED BADLY FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY 8 ASSASSINATION OF NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE SENIOR MINISTER SHERPAO, A TRUSTED LIEUTENANT OF BHUTTO, AND THE HARSH COUNTERMEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOP IN ITS WAKE. THESE INCLUDED THE ARREST OF THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY, AN NWFP/BALUCHISTAN-BASED ORGANIZATION FOR WHICH THE GOA HAS FREQUENTLY VOICED SUPPORT, THE BANNING OF THE PARTY ITSELF. ALTHOUGH THE GOP DID NOT ACCUSE KABUL OF DIRECT COMPLICITY IN THE KILLING, IT SHARPLY CONDEMNED THE GOA FOR CONTRIBUTING THROUGH ITS PROPAGANDA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO THE ATMOSPHERE OF VIOLENCE IN WHICH THE SLAYING TOOK PLACE. THE AFGHANS FOR THEIR PART ALLEGED THAT THE GOP HAD USED THE SHERPAO ASSASSINATION AS A PROTEXT FOR THE FURTHER SUPPRESSION OF THEIR PUSHTU AND BALUCH KINSMEN.

7. THESE LITTER CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES DESTROYED WHAT HAD BEEN THE FIRST REALLY PROMISING DEVELOPMENT IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS SINCE THE REPUBLICAN REGIME CAME TO POWER IN KABUL IN JULY 1973. ALTHOUGH A YEAR-END INVITATION BY BHUTTO TO PRESIDENT DAOUD FOR SUMMIT TALKS ABORTED, THE TWO SIDES HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING TO HOLD A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS AT PROGRESSIVELY MORE SENIOR LEVEL. THESE WERE TO HAVE BEGUN FEBRUARY 15. PROSPECTS FOR THEIR RESCEHDULING ARE BLEAK:THE GOA INSISTS THAT THE PAKS RELEASE THE NAP LEADERS AND LIFT THE BAN ON THE PARTY BEFORE IT WILL CONSIDER A DIALOGUE; THE GOP REJECTS SUCH PRECONDITIONS. MEANWHILE, THE PROPAGANDA LEVEL HAS GONE UP SEVERAL MORE NOTCHES.

8. PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED TIES NOW APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED NOT ONLY BY A HEIGHTENING IN BITTERNESS AND INVECTIVE BUT ALSO BY WHAT HAS COME TO BE A TIGHTENING OF

THE LINKS BETWEEN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND PAK DOMESTIC POLITICS. HIGHLIGHTED BY THE NAP ISSUE, THIS HAS REDUCED THE AREA FOR MANEUVER ON BOTH SIDES. SHERPAO'S DEATH

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HAS ALSO MEANT THAT BHUTTO HAS HAD TO RESTRUCTURE HIS CONTROL OF THE NWFP AND THUS REESTABLISH A POSITION OF STRENGTH FROM WHICH HE CAN DEAL BOTH WITH HIS REGIONAL CHALLENGERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS ACROSS THE BORDER. HE HAS NOT YET COMPLETED THE TASK.

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9. PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED

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BY THE GOA'S REACTION TO THE US MILITARY SUPPLY DECISION
AND PRESIDENT DAOUD'S RECENT SUBCONTINENTAL TRAVEL.
KABUL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO AS A
DESTABILIZING MOVE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST
THE PAKS IN THEIR AGGRESSIVE AND REPRESSIVE MEASURES WAS
ALMOST CERTAINLY INFLUENCED BY THE TENSE STATE OF ITS
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RELATIONS WITH GOP AT THE TIME WORD OF THE POLICY CHANGE
REACHED THE GOA. THE AFGHAN ATTITUDE ANNOYED THE GOP,
PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS VOICED BY DAOUD IN THE COURSE
OF VISITS TO NEW DELHI AND DACCA. THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT'S
TOUR, THOUGH LONG-PLANNED, ITSELF EXCITED SOME PAK SUSPICION
AND CONCERN THOUGH THIS NEVER APPROACHED IN INTENSITY THE
MOOD OF LAST SUMMER, WHEN THE PAKS ALLEGED INDO-AFGHAN
COLLUSION AGAINST THEM.

10. BANGLADESH. RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER
SOUTH ASIAN NATION, BANGLADESH, SHOW SOME SIGNS OF MOVING
OFF THE DEAD CENTER WHERE THEY HAVE RESTED SINCE TALKS
BETWEEN BHUTTO AND BD PRIME MINISTER MUJIB ABORTED LAST
JUNE. THE PAKS HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF BDG INTEREST IN
RESUMING DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND
HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PREAPRED FOR TALKS ON THAT
BASIS. THERE IS NO WORD, HOWEVER, ABOUT ANY AGREED
SCHEDULE FOR SUCH TALKS, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE HELD AT
THE FOREIGN SECRETARIES LEVEL.

11. SHOULD THE TALKS BE HELD, THEY WOULD REVOLVE
AROUND TWO CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WHICH REMAIN THE STUMBLING
BLOCKS TO FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION, THE
DIVISION OF PRE-1971 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND THE
FURTHER REPATRIATION OF BIHARIS TO PAKISTAN. THE POSITIONS
OF THE TWO SIDES ARE FAR APART ON BOTH. THE PAKS
CONTINUE TO TAKE A RELAXED VIEW OF THE IMPASSE: THEY
CERTAINLY SEEM LESS ANXIOUS THAN DO THE BENGALEES TO REACH
A SETTLEMENT. THEIR CONCLUSION THAT BD IN ITS PRESENT
PARLOUS STATE NEEDS THEM MORE THAN THEY NEED BD HAS
PROBABLY BEEN REINFORMED BY THE BDG CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES,
WIDELY VIEWED HERE AS A REFLECTION OF BENGALEE DESPERATION.
NOR DO THEY SEEM TO FEEL UNDER ANY SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL
OR DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO PROCEED FURTHER AT THIS TIME.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE
RESTORATION OF TRADE TIES ARE NOT SUFFICENTLY ATTRACTIVE
ENDS, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO INDUCE PAKISTAN TO COME
TO AN AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATION
IN WHAT BHUTTO HAS CASTIGATED AS BD'S "FANTASTIC" CLAIMS.

12. IRAN. THE VISIT OF THE SHAH IN LATE FEBRUARY, THE
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GENEROUS RESPONSE OF THE IRANIANS FOLLOWING THE SWAT-
HAZARA EARTHQUAKE AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR, AND THE WELL-
PUBLICIZED MID-FEBRUARY SESSION OF THE IRAN/PAKISTAN
JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION ALL
SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN OF IRAN'S
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THE SHAH'S PRIVATE
VISIT TO BHUTTO'S LARKANA COUNTRY SEAT HAD PARTICULAR
SIGNIFICANCE. ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT HAVE THE PUBLIC IMPACT
IT MIGHT HAVE HAD IT BEEN AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ISLAMABAD
AND LAHORE AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED (THE WORD HERE IS THAT
PROTOCOL CONSIDERATIONS LED THE IRANIANS TO INSIST ON
THE CHANGE), THE FACT THAT THE SHAH WAS PREPARED TO
COME TO PAKISTAN DURING A PERIOD OF SERIOUS PAK-AFGHAN
TENSION WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE GOP. THE SHAH'S
SUPPORT FOR THE MEASURES THE GOP HAD TAKEN IN THE BORDER
PROVINCES FOLLOWING THE SHERPAO ASSASSINATION MADE THE
VISIT AN EVEN MORE MEANINGFUL ONE FROM THE PAK VIEWPOINT.

13. THE REINVIGORATION OF CENTO, AND OF PAKISTAN'S ROLE
IN IT, HAS ALSO STRENGTHENED PAK-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND
SHOULD US-CONTROLLED WEAPONS BE TRANSFERRED FROM IRAN
TO PAKISTAN UNDER THE NEW SUPPLY POLICY THIS WILL DO SO
FURTHER. THE SHAH MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT PAKISTAN
SHOULD FOCUS ON DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT IN ITS PURCHASES BOTH
BECAUSE OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT IS TOO EXPENSIVE FOR THE
PAKS AND BECAUSE HE OPPOSED PAKISTAN'S MAKING AGGRESSIVE
MOVES AGAINST INDIA. THIS EVIDENT IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
STATUS QUO IN THE SUBCONTINENT, EVIDENCED ALSO BY
THE SHAP 'S FREQUENTLY REITERATED BACKING OF PAKISTAN'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND HIS DISCOURAGING OF AFGHAN
ACTIVITIES AND CLAIMS, HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT FORCE FOR
REGIONAL STABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE BETTER
TIES THE SHAH HAS DEVELOPED WITH KABUL AND NEW DELHI.

14. THE MAJOR POWERS: THE UNITED STATES. THE GREAT
WARMTH WHICH CHARACTERIZED BHUTTO'S EARLY FEBRUARY
MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH PRESIDENT FORD AND OTHER
AMERICAN LEADERS, AND THELIFTING OF THE US ARMS EMBARGO
WHICH FOLLOWED THE VISIT BROUGHT BILATERAL US-PAK RELATIONS
CLOSER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN FOR MANY YEARS. THE ANOMALOUS
AND DISCRIMINATORY EMBARGO HAD BEEN THE ONLY MAJOR
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BILATERAL PROBLEM BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND ITS
TERMINATION AFTER NINE YEARS WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT

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SATISFACTION IN PAKISTAN BOTH FOR ITS POLITICAL AND
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

15. THE PREVAILING MOOD IN THE GOP AND IN THE LARGER
PUBLIC FELL WELL SHORT OF ELATION, HOWEVER. ALTHOUGH
BHUTTO IS AWARE THAT HE HAS SCORED AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL
AND DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS WHICH HAS OBVIOUS DOMESTIC BENE-
FITS, THE GOP UNDERSTANDS THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE CHANGE
AND THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL GOVERN US SCRUTING OF
PAK REQUESTS FOR ARMS PURCHASES(NOTABLY THE DETERMINATION
OF THE USG NOT TO FUEL A SUBCONTINENTAL ARMS RACE OR UPSET
THE REGIONAL POWER BALANCE, AND THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES
TO INDO-PAK RECONCILATION). ALTHOUGH BHUTTO WON AN
UNEXPECTEDLY BROAD MEASURE OF US CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESS

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SUPPORT FOR HIS WASHINGTON EFFORTS, HE IS TOO SHREWD A
POLITICIAN NOT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS COULD EASILY BE
JEOPARDIZED WHOULD PAKISTAN SEEK TO UNDERTAKE AN AGGRESSIVE
REARMAMENT PROGRAM. HE IS PROCEEDING SLOWLY,
REEMPHASIZING HIS COMMITMENT TO FOCUS ON DEFENSIVE EQUIP-
MENT, AND STRESSING HIS CONTINUING DESIRE FOR NORMALIZATION
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OF RELATIONS WITH AN INDIA WHOSE ARMED SUPERIORITY HE
SAYS HE HAS NO INTEREST IN CHALLENGING. (A MONTH AFTER
THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO THE GOP HAD STILL NOT SUBMITTED
A SHOPPING LIST). ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY
THIS REALISTIC AND REASONABLE PAK ATTITUDE COULD EVENTUALLY
GIVE WAY TO WRANGLING OVER CONTROVERSIAL ITEMS OF EQUIP-
MENT AND TERMS OF PURCHASE--AT LEAST SOME GOP OFFICIALS
HAVE HINTED THAT THEY VIEW THE NEW POLICY CHANGE AS ONLY
A FIRST STEP--PROSPECTS FOR A FAIRLY LENGTHY PERIOD OF
US-PAK GOODWILL ON BILATERAL MATTERS SEEM EXCELLENT AT
THIS TIME.

16. CHINA. GOP RELATIONS WITH THE PRC REMAIN VERY CLOSE,
AND THE EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS
PRAISING EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY IS STANDARD FARE. (THE
PAK PRAISE IS OFTEN UNINFORMED; PAK IGNORANCE OF WHAT IS
ACTUALLY HAPPENING IN CHINA IS CONSIDERABLE). THE PAKS
PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO PRC SENSIBILITIES ON INTERNATIONAL,
PARTICULARLY EAST ASIAN ISSUES: A RECENT EXAMPLE IS
THEIR REBUFF OF US EFFORTS TO INDUCE THEM TO ESTABLISH
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN
ADDITION TO THOSE THEY NOW HAVE WITH PYONGYANG. THEY SEEM
UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE APPARENT IMPROVEMENT IN PEKING'S
RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, CONCLUDING THAT THIS DOES
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THEIR OWN TIES WITH THE PRC,
AND, ELSEWHERE IN SOUTH ASIA, SEEM TO HAVE NO PROBLEM
WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE MAY ESTABLISH DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH BEFORE THE IMPASSE
BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND DACCA IS RESOLVED.
17. THE SOVIET UNION. CERTAIN STRAINS APPEAR TO HAVE
BEEN INTRODUCED OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS INTO PAK-SOVIET
RELATIONS. THE PAKS RECENTLY CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO EXPRESSIONS
OF SOVIET CONCERN OVER CENTO'S STEPPED UP ACTIVITIES AND
PAKISTAN'S GREATER ROLE IN THEM, AND THEY SEEM TROUBLED

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THOUGH HARDLY ALARMED BY THIS. THEY ARE ALSO TROUBLED
BY REPORTED SOVIET UNHAPPINESS OVER THE SUCCESSFUL PAK
EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE USG TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO.
(THE CHINESE, BY CONTRAST, HAD LONG INDICATED THEIR FAVOR
FOR THE PROPOSED ARMS POLICY CHANGE). PAKISTAN'S STRAINED
RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN MAY ALSO BE CAUSING SOME
UNEASE IN ISLAMABAD-MOSCOW TIES. ALTHOUGH THE PAKS
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HAVE BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR THE GOA, LET ALONE ANY IMPUTATION OF EVEN
THE MOST INDIRECT SOVIET ROLE IN THE TROUBLES IN THE BORDER
PROVINCES, IT SEEMS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT ANY UPSURGE OF
TENSION WITH AFGHANISTAN HAS AN UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON
PAK THINKING ABOUT KABUL'S PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER AND
GREAT-POWER FRIEND.

18. THE MUSLIM WORLD. THE IRANIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE
SWAT/HAZARA EARTHQUAKE RELIEF FUND (ONE MILLION DOLLARS)
WAS ONLY A MINOR PART OF AN UNPRECEDENTEDLY GENEROUS
RESPONSE FROM THE OIL-RICH ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. OVER
$40,000,000 IN ALL, IT DRAMATIZED AS NO OTHER SINGLE
DEVELOPMENT HAS DONE THE SUCCESS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF GOP EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE MUSLIM
WORLD. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE THESE RELATIONSHIPS HAVE
PAID ENORMOUS DIVIDENDS TO PAKISTAN: WE ESTIMATE THAT IN
1974 PAKISTAN RECEIVED $1.1 BILLION IN COMMITMENTS FROM
THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES INCLUDING IRAN. PLITICAL
ADVANTAGES ARE LESS TANGIBLE, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
GOP DERIVES MUCH SATISFACTION FROM ITS TIES WITH SUCH
MUSLIM FRIENDS AS THE UAE, SAUDI ARABIA, AND KUWAIT.
TO ENSURE CONTINUING AND ENHANCED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT (AND BECAUSE IT IS THE "NATURAL" AND POLITICALLY
POPULAR COURSE TO FOLLOW), PAKISTAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO
BACK MUSLIM CAUSES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDEAST, AND TO
AVOID ANY PUBLIC DIFFERENCES OF POSITION WITH WHAT THE
GOP TERMS "THE MAINSTREAM OF ARAB OPINION". PAKISTAN
WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SEEK TO AVOID ANY ENTANGLEMENT IN
INTRAMURAL MUSLIM DISPUTES, AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE SECURITY
ROLE IT PLAYS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, WILL GO ON EMPHASIZING
THAT AS A MODERATE SIZED COUNTRY, IT IS NEITHER
INTERESTED IN OR CAPABLE OF POSING A THREAT TO LOCAL INTERESTS.

19. THE THIRD WORLD. PAKISTAN'S ALLEGIANCE TO
MUSLIM CAUSES OFTEN PARALLELS ITS EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
ITS THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS. THESE EFFORTS EXPLAIN WHAT
FROM THE USG VIEWPOINT IS THE GOP'S OFTEN EXASPERATING
VOTING RECORD IN THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS:
IT ACKNOWLEDGES ITS UNHAPPINESS AS A MODERATE GOVERNMENT
WITH A PARTICULAR POSITION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD WORLD

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MAJORITY, ASSURES US THAT IT WILL NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN
PUSHING THE MATTER, BUT TELLS US THAT IT CANNOT AFFORD
TO PART COMPANY WITH ITS VOTING BLOC COLLEAGUES. ITS
POSITIONS ON "COLONIAL" ISSUES ARE PARTICULARLY CHARACTERIZED
BY THIS APPROACH.

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ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 ISO-00 OMB-01 AID-05 SAJ-01

ACDA-05 MC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

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EB-07 CIEP-01 TRSE-00 /104 W
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R 280924Z MAR 75
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9363
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC

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20. PROGNOSIS. RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN
WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEY AREAS TO WATCH IN THE COMING
MONTHS. THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF INDO-PAK CIVIL
AIR NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE RESUMPTION OF OVERFLIGHTS
AND OF DIRECT AIR LINKS BY INDIAN AND PAK FLAG CARRIERS
WILL BE WIDELY REGARDED AS THE CLEAREST INDICATION OF THE
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COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.
THE PAKS SEEM ANXIOUS FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE TRICKY
ISSUES; AS INDICATED ABOVE, THE GOI SEEMS LESS HOPEFUL.

21. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CIVIL AIR DEADLOCK IS THE LAST
ITEM IN SIMLA PARAGRAPH3--MEASURES DESIGNED " PROGRESSIVELY
TO RESTORE AND NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEE N THE TWO
COUNTRIES STEP BY STEP"-- WHICH HAS SERVED AS AN AGENDA
FOR THE SERIES OF TALKS WHICH BEGAN IN SEPTEMBER.
IN JANUARY, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD CONSOLIDATED AND
FORMALIZED AN EARLIER AGREEMENT ON THE RESUMPTION OF
INDO-PAK TRADE AND FURTHERNEGOTIATIONS ON SPECIFIC
TRADE AND SHIPPING MATTERS ARE EXPECTED SHORTLY.
BUT ALL THESE CONCERN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC UNDER-
STANDINGS ALREADY REACHED. INSOFAR AS FUNDAMENTALS
ARE CONCERNED, RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL AIR ISSUE WILL
LEAVE ONLY THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND A
FINAL SETTLEMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR ON THE FORMAL SIMLA
AGENDA.

22. THE PAK STANCE ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS REMAINS WHAT IT
HAS BEEN SINCE LAST SEPTEMBER: THE BALL, THEY SAY, IS
IN THE INDIANS' COURT AND THEY INTEND TOMAKE NO FURTHER
EFFORT TO INDUCE A CHANGE IN THE GOI POSITION. AS FOR
KASHMIR, A FINAL FORMAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CORE PROBLEM
IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS NOW SEEMS REMOTE AS EVER.
BHUTTO'S OWN RECENT REMARKS ON THE ISSUE HAVE LARGELY
BEEN REITERATIONS OF EARLIER GOP POSITIONS,
THOUGH HE MADE AT LEAST ONE UNHELPFUL COMMENT IN REPORTEDLY
TELLING A WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT THAT PAKISTAN WOULD
CONSIDER GOING TO WAR OVER KASHMIR IF INDIA REJECTED ALL
EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO PUBLICLY
CALLED FOR TALKS WITH THE GOI ON THE ISSUE, DESPITE WHAT
SEEMS THE OBVIOUS ABSENCE AT PRESENT OF ANY MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE BASIS ON WHICH SUCH TALKS COULD BE LAUNCHED
LET ALONE SUCCEED. WHILE THE PRESENT STIRRING UP OF THE
KASHMIR POT MAY GO ON FOR SOME TIME LONGER, OUR ASSESS-

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MENT IS THAT THE GOP WILL CONTINUE TO SEE THE FOLLY AND ALMOST CERTAIN DISASTER INVOLVED IN ANY FRESH KASHMIR ADVENTURE AND, WHATEVER ITS RHETORIC, WILL GO ON LIVING WITH THE DE FACTO SITUATION.
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23. LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVED PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS SEEMS LIKELY FOR THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS. THE PAKISTAN SUPREME COURT IS NOW REVIEWING THE GOP'S DECISION TO BAN THE NAP. SOME OBSERVERS SEE IN A COURT-ORDERED REVERSAL (UNLIKELY) A POSSIBLE ESCAPE FROM THE PRESENT IMPASSE OVER CONDITIONS FOR THE RESCHEDULING OF THE ABORTED HIGH-LEVEL TALKS. BUT SUCH A SETBACK WOULD INTRODUCE NEW STRESSES INTO PAK POLITICS, AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT BHUTTO WOULD BE IN A MOOD TO SEE IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INCREASED MANEUVERABILITY. NOR DOES THERE SEEM ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PM WILL LIFT THE BAN AND RELEASE THE DETAINEES ON HIS OWN. WHILE SOME PROGRESS COULD BE MADE WITHOUT DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS AT LEAST IN LOWERING THE LEVEL OF PROPAGANDA, THE GOP HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A THIRD PARTY INITIATIVE ALONG THESE LINES, THE GOA DOES NOT APPEAR PREPARED TO SACRIFICE THE WEAPON ITS RADIO AFFORDS IT. FURTHER THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS SEEM UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

24. AT THE SAME TIME, NO FURTHER DETRIORATION IN RELATIONS SEEMS IN THE CARDS. THE WORST OF THE TENSION APPEARS ALREADY TO HAVE PEAKED AND HOSTILITIES OR THE CLOSING OF THE BORDER, NEVERY LIKELY FROM THE PAK SIDE, SEEM EVEN LESS LIKELY NOW.

25. PROGRESS TOWARDNORMALIZATION OF PAK-BD RELATIONS REMAINS UNCERTAIN; IT SEEM LARGELY UP TO DACCA. PAKISTAN RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD, INCLUDING IRAN, WILL STAY CLOSE. THE INCREASED WARMTH IN US-PAK RELATIONS IS ALSO LIKELY TO BE MAINTAINED DURING THE COMING QUARTER ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD UPSET THIS FORECAST. NO CHANGE IN THE GOP'S CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH PEKING IS ANTICIPATED. THERE COULD BE SOME DETERIORATION IN PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS; THIS WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR MOSCOW DECIDES TO PRESS ITS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE PAKS' REVIVING WESTERN SECURITY CONNECTIONS AND THE EXTENT OF ITS PARTISANSHIP IN THE PAK-AFGHAN DISPUTE.
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